Everyone with any interest in railways in Britain has heard of the notorious Dr Beeching, most of them regarding him as practically a murderer. Just in case you’re one of the few who hasn’t, he was commissioned in 1962 by the Minister of Transport to come up with a plan that would reduce the vast losses that the national railway network was incurring. He recommended closing a great many lines, mostly rural branch lines that had long since outlived their contribution to society. Nearly every closure he proposed was implemented in the couple of years that followed.
As a consequence, whenever anyone talks about a closed railway, they’ll always talk about “the Beeching axe”, as the papers called it at the time. Yet a great many lines were closed before Beeching, as the railways desperately tried to make economies in the 1950s and even before that. The Beeching closures amounted to about 6000 miles, equal to earlier closures in the decades before his report.
My personal opinion is that Beeching did the railways a huge favour, saving money on lines that by the 1960s had no hope of ever making money or even serving much of a social purpose. But I make few friends among railway enthusiasts by saying so.
To understand why I hold this opinion, we need to go back a long way in history.
Before 1914, railways were the only practical means of inland transport over distances of more than a few miles. A town with no railway was almost literally not on the map. Abingdon, in Oxfordshire, opposed the line to Oxford passing through it. Once of equal importance to Reading or Oxford, it started to decay immediately. Two decades later, the town had to beg the Great Western railway to build a branch line and put it back on the map. Even so it never recovered, and is now a quaint little town of no great importance, and no railway service.
Nearly all of Britain’s railway system was complete by 1870. The odd country branch line was built later, and a few improvements to the trunk network, like the Great Western’s cutoff for its Birmingham services which opened as late as 1911. Nearly all lines made money or at least covered their costs. Only a few rural lines served such a sparse population that they lost money, despite having a monopoly of passenger and freight traffic. Even then, most such lines were owned by the major companies, who did not reveal the details of which lines lost money - even if they knew themselves. A tiny number remained in independent ownership, usually because the big companies could see what a financial disaster they were and kept well away.
Railways weren’t always built to provide transportation. The fenland village of Ramsey had two branch lines which met head-on, each built by a different company that wanted to make sure the other couldn’t extend its line any further. Not surprisingly, one of these was amongst the first closures. Some lengthy lines were built purely as speculation, albeit with a purported justification to serve the locality. The idea was to sell, at a profit of course, to either the incumbent, or else to a challenger trying to invade their territory. The much-loved Somerset and Dorset Joint was the best-known such example.
Railway operation in 1900 was a very labour-intensive affair. Steam locomotives needed not only a driver and a fireman, but a whole crew of cleaners, fitters and others who took care of them when they were not running. Even the smallest country station would have a stationmaster, several porters, booking clerks and so on. Freight traffic was carried in individual wagons which had to be loaded and unloaded by hand, and shunted several times before reaching their destination. Every few miles there was a signalbox, with its crew of signalmen. The track had to be regularly inspected and maintained. None of this was a problem in 1900, when labour was cheap, and working on the railway even in the lowliest of roles was a good job for a working-class man.
The apogee of British railways was in 1914. Road transport was still impractical for anything but the ride to the station. But the war changed everything. In 1918 road vehicles had become relatively reliable, there were lots of them available as war surplus, and there were plenty of trained drivers. Within a few years, rural bus services became commonplace. Even before 1914, the railway companies had experimented with them to connect with railway-less villages. But now they were a practical and often superior solution to the train. A bus could pass through the village centre, and could go directly to where people wanted to go. The train, after a slow and uncomfortable journey in tired Victorian carriages, would often leave people at a junction station in the middle of nowhere to wait in the cold for a connecting train.
The railways largely failed to react to any of this. Stations continued to be open and fully staffed. It was as though the railway companies believed they had a sacred duty to keep even the most unprofitable line open exactly as it had been in 1900. They did take a few steps, experimenting with steam or petrol railcars to replace a steam engine and a handful of ancient carriages. But it was very half-hearted.
During the 1920s there were a handful of closures, generally where the bus was obviously superior. For example, the Wantage Tramway stopped carrying passengers over the couple of miles from the town to the railway in 1925. But even then, it remained open for freight. It was extremely rare for a line to close completely before 1939, for freight as well as passengers - more evidence of the “sacred duty” idea.
The 1930s saw more closures along the same pattern. The coal strike of 1931 resulted in a few closures which became permanent, again where it was obvious that a bus could do a better job. A few truly hopeless lines also closed, like the Isle of Axholme Joint in Lincolnshire, which served nothing but a huge expanse of swamp and marshland.
Quite why some other lines escaped is a mystery. For example the Wroxham to County School branch, in Norfolk, was built solely to stop the proposed parallel Midland and Great Northern main line from getting approval. It failed. The M&GN opened at the same time, and the Wroxham line was condemned to losing money hand over fist. Yet it remained open, fully staffed with several trains a day and losing money every day, from 1882 for 70 years until it finally closed in 1952. And even then it stayed open for freight.
But in the 1930s the railways still had a monopoly on all long distance traffic, passenger and freight. For most of them, their best source of revenue was coal and other minerals, hundreds of millions of tons hauled every year from the coalfields to the cities. The losses on a few ancient trains trundling nearly empty up and down country railways was lost in the accounting noise.
The next war changed things, again. At its end the railways were exhausted both physically and financially. In 1948 the new Labour government combined all the railway companies into the nationalised British Railways (BR). In its first year it lost nearly £10M - about 2% of its total turnover. And it just went downhill from there. The roads were taking a bigger and bigger share of both passengers and freight, but the fixed costs of the railway, in manpower and other maintenance, had barely changed since 1900 - except for constantly increasing with inflation.
In the 1950s, there were more baby steps to try and reduce the losses. A lot of truly hopeless country lines - like Wroxham and County School - were closed. But BR’s problems were much, much worse than a few country branch lines. BR management during the 1950s was awful, financially speaking. Revenue was in steady decline, due to competition from road traffic and the emerging airlines which were taking premium passenger traffic.
One of BR’s first steps was to commission a whole range of new steam locomotives,. They were magnificent engines, taking the best ideas from all the pre-nationalisation companies. But the future lay with diesel traction, as the rest of the world had already realised. In 1955, BR suddenly woke up to this and launched their Modernisation Plan. This consisted of buying a huge range of incompatible and untried diesel locomotives from every possible vendor. A few of them worked well, but most of them were unsuccessful or flat out disastrous. And despite this new plan, steam locomotive construction continued, the last of the BR standard types being produced as late as 1959. They had all been withdrawn from service just eight years later, by 1967 - a huge waste of money and resources.
Meanwhile the operating side of the railway also remained stuck in the 1930s. Massive new marshalling yards were being built for wagonload traffic, just as this was all being taken away by trucks, adding to the uncontrolled capital expenditure of the Modernisation Plan.
By 1962, BR was losing an incredible £300,000 per day - about £100 million (in 1961 money don’t forget) per year. This was about a quarter of total revenue, and clearly unsustainable. The Minister of Transport appointed a certain Dr Beeching as head of BR, with a brief to see what, if anything, could be done to at least control the losses. Beeching was a physicist, with no previous railway experience. His career up to then had largely been with the chemical company ICI.
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| Lines Proposed for Closure by Beeching |
Coal made up 60% of all freight traffic, practically all of it originating in collieries. It seems like ideal rail traffic. Yet it was just barely profitable, because of handling methods unchanged since the 19th century. Wooden wagons carrying just 10 tons were still shunted individually both at the colliery and at rural stations, where they were unloaded by men with shovels. The obvious modern alternative, of using huge modern metal wagons in undivided trains, hadn’t been considered.
If that was bad, general freight was truly awful. It made up about 20% of the traffic, and cost about 4 times as much to handle as it made in revenue. Once again this was a result of 19th century handling techniques, from vast marshalling yards where individual wagons were sorted and resorted into complete trains, to picturesque Thomas-the-Tank-Engine style pick-up goods trains serving country branches.
Beeching’s proposals for freight were largely adopted during the 1960s, with little controversy. Wagonload freight was abandoned, writing off the millions spent on marshalling yards a few years earlier. Bulk coal traffic was moved to “merry go round” trains that were loaded and unloaded while still moving at low speed.
Analysis of passenger trains showed, unsurprisingly, that rural stopping trains were an economic disaster. On average they cost twice as much to run as they took in fares - without even counting the fixed cost of the railway itself. By 1960 nearly all stopping services were operated by diesel multiple units (DMUs) which at least avoided the overhead of servicing steam locomotives. But they still needed a crew of two, and many stations still had a stationmaster, ticket clerks, porters and the rest despite some moves towards unstaffed stations and issuing tickets on the train.
The report took as an example the rural service between Thetford and Swaffham, in Norfolk. This was the northern extremity of a string of branch lines extending south all the way nearly to Colchester in Essex. The other parts had been closed in the early 50s, but somehow this remnant survived. Trains carried an average of nine passengers each, and since that included market days and school traffic, probably a good many of them ran completely empty. Receipts from these trains covered an estimated tenth of the cost of running them and of maintaining the railway for them to run on. You don’t need a degree in economics to see why this made no sense, especially since there was a parallel bus service.
Publication of the report caused outrage. Just because nobody ever travelled on these rural lines, didn’t mean they weren’t fiercely attached to the principle and to the nostalgia. There was a procedure, which most of the time was just a rubber stamp for what BR proposed. They would negotiate replacement bus services, maybe delay the closure by a few months for some local reason. But in the end, the line was closed.
The report did consider the possibility that closures might cause social hardship, with a whole section of the topic. IT can be summarised as, "You told us to show how to save money; if that causes hardship, that needs to be dealt with, and maybe you'll ignore our recommendation, but it wasn't part of our remit."
There were a few exceptions. Generally they were lines where there was a real social justification. On purely financial grounds, Beeching proposed to close all railways north of Inverness. The social justification to retain them was clear, but for the first time the railway was refusing just to swallow the cost of a financially hopeless but socially necessary line. It was fine when such lines could be cross-subsidised by generous profits from hauling coal and long-distance passengers - as they had been five decades earlier. But in 1960, those profits had ben replaced by massive and unsustainable losses.
Gerard Fiennes, the brilliant manager of BR Eastern Region at the time, wanted to save the East Suffolk Line, which runs along the Suffolk coast from Ipswich to Lowestoft. He transformed it into a “basic railway”, with no station staff and every possible cost saving. The operating cost was reduced by two-thirds. As a result, it is still operating now. Probably some other marginal lines could have been saved if the railway management had thought to do this to every rural railway.
Railways have made a huge comeback since the 1960s - thank goodness. Every now and then a closed station or line is brought back to life. Beeching’s detractors - nearly everyone - would argue that none of these lines should have been closed. This ignores not only the massive losses they were making, but the fact that they served less and less of a social purpose, with increasing car ownership and frequently superior bus services. With sixty years of hindsight, there are a few lines which would be useful now if they hadn’t been closed. But nobody can see six decades into the future, no more than they could in 1900 to see how unprofitable these lines would be in 1960.
Looking at the lines that were actually closed, it’s hard to see how almost any of them could be viable now. If they have a social role to play, there’s no reason why the railway should subsidise that - and indeed such lines often receive subsidies from local government. But that money has to come from somewhere, and is in competition with other social amenities and contributions. In fact it’s hard to see that most of the closed lines should have remained open, or could usefully be reopened, even considering social value beyond monetary cost.
The obvious benefit of Beeching’s plan was to reduce the railway’s losses to the point that country could afford to have a railway network - although poor financial management continued through the 1960s. But there was another benefit that isn’t discussed. A couple of years later, under further pressure to make the railways financially viable, Beeching came up with a second plan. And in 1970, there was another try, the Serpell Report. If that had been implemented, remaining route mileage would have been cut by more than half. Most of Scotland, Wales and the West Country would have been left without trains.
But the huge negative reaction to the original Beeching report meant that the public had no stomach for cuts like this. It would have been political suicide for a government to have tried to implement it. The Serpell report was quietly buried almost before it was published. So the original Beeching Report, by energizing a kind of collective immune resistance to railway closures, actually saved much of the network later on.
Personally, I regret as much as anyone not being able to experience a traditional steam branch line, but I also recognise the need for railways to cover their costs, like any business. For a dose of pure nostalgia, the UK is now covered with preserved railways, which aim to deliver a similar experience although always a bit artificial.
References
- The original report, The Reshaping of British Railways, is readily available used, on Amazon or elsewhere. It is also available online at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Index:The_Reshaping_of_British_Railways_(Beeching_Report).pdf
- Gerard Fiennes explains the creation of the East Suffolk “Basic railway” in his excellent book, I Tried to Run a Railway, long since out of print but readily available used.
- R.H.N. Hardy wrote Beeching: Champion of the Railway? along the same theme as abive, though in a lot more detail.
- To see how the traditional railway operated, with half a dozen steam trains a day trundling back and forth, one of the David & Charles reprints of an older Bradshaw is indispensable, preferably the 1938 edition.









